Outline of the history of the
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

The objective of the strategic bombing campaign waged from 1943 to 1945 against Germany by the U.S. Eighth Air Force in England (later joined by the Fifteenth Air Force operating from Mediterranean area bases) was to cripple Germany's ability to fight by destroying that part of the nation's economy that provided matériel and supplies for its armed forces. The AAF (Army Air Forces) officers, recognizing that their own understanding of industrial economies was limited, had early sought out help from civilian experts and used civilian knowledge and advice in formulating target lists and plans. They even called on civilian management experts to aid in making the AAF's internal operations as efficient and effective as possible.

With the background of this special military-civilian relationship, it was natural that the thoughts of AAF officers seeking an assessment of strategic bombing should turn to civilian experts. Not historians, but men who were masters of economics, management, engineering, and other fields of knowledge of direct relevance.

As it worked its way up to the upper ranks in 1944 the idea of an objective assessment of strategic bombing in the light of the experience in bombing Germany met political reality. The AAF had been born in struggle with the Army and Navy, and its leaders foresaw a post-war reengagement. There would be a sharp debate over the formation of an independent Air Force, over its scope of responsibility, and over its share of the nation's defense resources. The question of strategic bombing's role in the defeat of Germany and its importance relative to other contributions would assume critical importance in this debate. It was supremely important that any survey be done right and come to the right conclusions, conclusions that would support the Air Force.

With preparations by AAF officers well underway, members of America's Eastern Establishment were invited to lead the USSBS. After it was turned down by several others, the chair went to Franklin D'Olier (1877-1953), president of Prudential Life Insurance and a World War I officer who had a son serving with the AAF. Prominent, well-connected, well-disposed toward the Air Force cause but having no knowledge or ideas of his own regarding strategic air power, D'Olier seemed a man to be counted upon. He did not disappoint the trust of the AAF leaders.

D'Olier would not actually direct the activities of the USSBS. For that he relied on deputies, selected from other prominent men. The vice-chairman was Henry C. Alexander (1902-1969), a New York lawyer and J. P. Morgan bank partner, who would take on primary responsibility for organizing and directing the Survey's operations in Europe. Nine other men were appointed as directors under D'Olier and Alexander, each leading efforts in a specific field of German industry or economy.

Among the most notable of the directors were:

• George W. Ball (1909-1994), an attorney who had spent the war thus far aiding in economic analysis of Germany and in dealing with the economic issues of U. S. allies.
• John Kenneth Galbraith (1908-2006), Princeton University economics professor who had been active in U. S. wartime economic management.
• Paul H. Nitze (1907-2004), a wealthy and successful financier who also had been aiding economic management.

Each would go on to play prominent public roles for decades following the war. Other directors were leading academic, industrial, or government experts.

Another appointment also was significant. To head the military presence on the study and make sure it did not get off course the AAF leadership chose Major General Orvil A. Anderson (1895-1965), a smart, hard-headed AAF officer who was an ardent supporter of strategic bombing and independence for the Air Force. Anderson was very watchful for any sign that the effort might be deviating from the AAF's intent and was not reluctant to make his views very clearly known.

With its quickly-assembled crew of hundreds of military personnel and civilian experts, the USSBS swept through Europe immediately in the wake of -- occasionally in front of -- advancing U. S. troops, inspecting bombed factories, collecting records, and interrogating Germans. Two Survey personnel were killed by enemy action and several wounded.

The Survey published its 109-page "Overall Report" and condensed "Summary Report" on September 30, 1945. After at least one unsatisfactory draft and a good deal of intense debate among the Survey leaders, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote what, with some revision, became the "Overall Report". Notwithstanding Galbraith's later public scorn for strategic bombing, it was a good report from the standpoint of the Air Force advocates, concluding, "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive."

The Overall Report went beyond this endorsement to present much specific data regarding the campaign and its results. Behind these facts and figures were more than 210 specialized reports (counts vary). These specialized reports represent an extremely extensive and in many ways unique source of information on many aspects of the European War.