General George C. Marshall (1880-1959), installed as the Chief of Staff of the Army in the fall of 1939, was cautiously optimistic that the air leaders might be able to deliver on their promises, at least to an extent that would avoid a repetition of the ghastly casualty tolls of World War I. As war loomed in 1941, he concluded that there was a genuine need for a considerable degree of autonomy for the air force and agreed to the establishment of the Army Air Forces (AAF) under General H. H. "Hap" Arnold (1886-1950). While Arnold remained formally Marshall's subordinate, he literally won a "seat at the table" -- next to Marshall (and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King) on the newly-forming Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the considerable autonomy that this implied.

Arnold was a realist who fully recognized the need to ensure that the AAF played on the team with the ground and naval forces. But at his core he was an ardent proponent of strategic bombing as the war-winning weapon, and that was where his heart truly lay. He never missed an opportunity to press for this.

With near-autonomy and undreamed-of resources, the AAF bent its efforts to bringing its theories of decisive precision daylight strategic bombing to reality. The plan of the Allies was to keep any war with Japan on the back burner and concentrate strength on the first task of defeating Germany, but the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and Japan's rapid advance toward Australia created a situation in which response seemed necessary to stave off disaster -- all the more so as Australian forces in North Africa and Europe were making important contributions to the war effort there.

Frustratingly, Japan was not a candidate for truly strategic bombing, simply because no existing AAF bomber could reach the island nation with a worthwhile bomb load while flying from the bases that lay within Allied reach.

So the AAF stood with the Army, Navy, and the Australian forces in striving to plug the multiple leaks in the Pacific defenses, while simultaneously working to get a decisive campaign going in Europe from bases in England. The services, and to some extent individual commands, cooperated while also competing for honor and resources.

But as it became clear that an early invasion of Europe was not a realistic hope, a decision was reached to land American and British troops in North Africa in order to wipe out the German and Italian presence there and put some pressure on the Axis in Europe. The resulting OPERATION TORCH, involving landings in Morocco and Algeria in November 1942 and subsequent extensive combat operations, drew down the forces the AAF had built up for its strategic bombing campaign and diverted them to tactical and operational support missions. AAF planners gritted their teeth and went back to building forces in England as rapidly as possible.

The first bombing mission of the Eighth Air Force -- the American strategic bomber force based in England -- was flown against a rail marshalling yard in Rouen, France by twelve B-17s on 17 August 1942. On 27 January 1943 some 91 B-17s and B-24s conducted a raid on the port of Wilhelmshaven, their first target in Germany proper.

Still the demands of North Africa and later the Mediterranean as well as bad weather held the level of effort down through the spring of 1943. Gradually the bombing campaign mounted in intensity and reach. Many frustrations were encountered, including difficult weather conditions, strong and resourceful German opposition, and a variety of technical and logistical limitations. The accuracy of the bombing was far worse than that which had been achieved in practice runs under less challenging conditions. Targets proved less vulnerable than had been supposed and the Germans were very quick to restore critical damage. On average, losses per raid were little higher than had been expected, but many more raids were needed than had been hoped and the losses mounted progressively.